Section: Suretyship for the body of anyone whose presence is required in a court of law for a binding debt is valid, regardless of whether the debt is known or unknown. Some Shafiʿites said: It is not valid for one who owes an unknown debt, because it may become impossible to bring the guaranteed person, thus the debt would become binding upon the guarantor, and it would not be possible to demand it from him due to his ignorance of it. We hold that suretyship is for the body, not the debt, and the body is known, so the suretyship does not become void due to a contingent possibility. Furthermore, we have already clarified that guaranteeing an unknown is valid—which is a commitment to wealth from the outset—so a suretyship that is not related to wealth from the outset is even more valid. Suretyship for a minor or an insane person is valid because it may be necessary to bring them to court for testimony against them regarding destruction of property, and the permission of their guardian takes the place of their own permission. Suretyship for the body of an imprisoned or absent person is also valid. Abu Hanifa said: It is not valid. We hold that any document (wathiqa) that is valid in the presence of a person is also valid in his absence or imprisonment, like a mortgage or a guarantee. Moreover, imprisonment does not prevent delivery, because an imprisoned person can be delivered by the order of the ruler or the order of the one who imprisoned him, and then he is returned to imprisonment with both rights satisfied. As for an absent person, one travels to him and brings him, provided the absence is not permanent (munqatiʿa), which is when one knows his whereabouts. If one does not know his whereabouts, the debt becomes binding upon him, according to Al-Qadi. In another place, he said: It does not become binding upon him until a period of time has passed in which he could have returned him, but failed to do so.

Section: Suretyship for the body of someone who owes a hadd penalty is not valid, whether it is a right of Allah the Almighty—such as the hadd for adultery or theft—or a right of a human being—such as the hadd for slander or retaliation (qisas). This is the opinion of most scholars, among them Shurayh and Al-Hasan. Ishaq, Abu ʿUbayd, Abu Thawr, and the People of Opinion (Ashab al-Ra'y) also held this view. Al-Shafiʿi also held this view regarding the penalties (hudud) of Allah the Almighty, though his opinion differed regarding the penalties of human beings. He said in one place: There is no suretyship in the penalties of human beings, nor for a case of liʿan. In another place, he said: Suretyship is permissible for one who owes a right or