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حولتواصلتبرّعبيانات النشرالخصوصيةشروط الاستخدامحق الانسحابإلغاء اشتراك
المغني لابن قدامة - ت التركي
مجلد 8 · صفحة 226فصل

الترجمة · EN

Section: If a crime resulting in a financial liability is committed against the endowed property, it is obligatory [to receive compensation]; for its financial value has not been nullified. Even if its financial value were nullified, the indemnity for the crime committed against it would not be nullified, for the indemnity of a crime against a free person is obligatory. If [the endowed person] is killed, its value is obligatory. The beneficiary of the endowment does not have the right to pardon this [indemnity], because he does not have exclusive rights to it; rather, an equal to the victim should be purchased with it and remain an endowment. Some Shafi'ites said: The beneficiary of the endowment has exclusive rights to the value if we say that he owns the endowed property, because it is a substitute for his property. Our position is that it is property to which he does not have exclusive rights, so he does not have exclusive rights to its substitute, like a jointly-owned mortgaged slave. The explanation for the lack of exclusivity is evident, for the right of the second generation is attached to it, so it is not permissible to invalidate it. We do not know the extent of what is due to him from it so that he might pardon any of it, thus pardoning any of it is not valid, just as if a man destroyed a mortgaged item, its value would be taken from him and made a mortgage, and it would not be valid for either of them to pardon it. If the crime is purely intentional and committed by an equal, the apparent position is that retaliation (qisas) is not obligatory, because it is a subject to which the beneficiary of the endowment does not have exclusive rights, so it is not permissible to seek retaliation from the killer, like a jointly-owned slave. Some of the Shafi'i scholars said: This is for the Imam [to decide]. If the slave's hand or one of his limbs is cut off, then retaliation is his, and he may execute it, because no one else shares it with him. If the cutting does not warrant retaliation, or it does but it is pardoned, half of his value becomes obligatory. If it is possible to purchase a complete slave with it, [that is done]; otherwise, a share of a slave is purchased with it.

Section: It is permissible to marry an endowed slave girl, because it is a contract regarding her utility, similar to leasing. Furthermore, the beneficiary of the endowment does not own the right to utilize this benefit, so he is not harmed by someone else acquiring it. Her guardian is the beneficiary of the endowment, because she is his property, and the dowry (mahr) belongs to him, because it is a substitute for her utility, similar to the wage in a lease. It is also possible that it is not permissible to marry her, because it is a contract for her utility for her entire life, which leads to the loss of her utility for the second generation. Also, marriage entails obligations, such as the duty to allow the husband to enjoy her and [her staying overnight with him], so her service during the night is lost to the second generation.

الحواشي

(19) In manuscript M: "we pardon". (20) Omitted from the original.

العربية (المصدر)

فصل: وإن جُنِىَ على الوَقْفِ جِنَايةٌ مُوجِبَةٌ للمالِ، وَجَبَ؛ لأن مالِيَّتَهُ لم تَبْطُلْ، ولو بَطَلَتْ مالِيَّتُه لم يَبْطُلْ أرْشُ الجِنَايةِ عليه، فإنَّ الحُرَّ يَجبُ أرْشُ الجنَايةِ عليه، فإن قُتِلَ وَجَبَتْ قِيمَتُه، وليس لِلْمَوْقُوفِ عليه العَفْوُ عنها؛ لأنَّه لا يَخْتَصُّ بها، ويُشْتَرى بها مثل المَجْنِيِّ عليه يكونُ وَقْفًا. وقال بعضُ الشافِعِيَّةِ: يَخْتَصُّ المَوْقُوفُ عليه بالقِيمَةِ إن قُلْنا: إنَّه يَمْلِكُ المَوْقُوفَ، لأنَّه بَدَلُ مِلْكِه. ولَنا، أنَّه مِلْكٌ لا يَخْتَصُّ به، فلم يَخْتَصَّ بِبَدَلِه، كالعَبْدِ المُشْتَركِ المَرْهُونِ، وبَيَانُ عَدَمِ الاخْتِصاصِ ظاهِرٌ، فإنَّه يَتَعَلَّقُ به حَقُّ البَطْنِ الثاني، فلم يَجُزْ إبْطالُه. ولا نَعْلَمُ قَدْرَ ما يَسْتَحِقُّ هذا منه فيَعْفُوَ (١٩) عنه، فلم يَصِحَّ العَفْوُ عن شيءٍ منه، كما لو أتْلَفَ رَجُلٌ رَهْنًا، أُخِذَتْ منه قِيمَتُه فجُعِلَتْ رَهْنًا، ولم يَصِحَّ عَفْوُ واحدٍ منهما عنه. وإن كانت الجِنَايَةُ عَمْدًا مَحْضًا من مُكَافِىءٍ له، فالظَّاهِرُ أنَّه لا يَجِبُ القِصَاصُ؛ لأنَّه مَحلٌّ لا يَخْتَصُّ به المَوْقُوفُ عليه، فلم يَجُزْ أن يَقْتَصَّ من قاتِلِه، كالعَبْدِ المُشْتَركِ. وقال بعضُ أصْحابِ الشافِعِيِّ: يكونُ ذلك إلى الإِمامِ، فإن قُطِعَتْ يَدُ العَبْدِ أو طَرَفٌ من أطْرَافِه، فالقِصَاصُ له، وله اسْتِيفاؤُه؛ لأنَّه لا يُشَارِكُه فيه غيرُه، وإن كان القَطْعُ لا يُوجِبُ القِصَاصَ، أو يُوجِبُه فعُفِىَ عنه، وَجَبَ نِصْفُ قِيمَتِه، فإن أمْكَنَ أن يُشْتَرَى بها عَبْدٌ كامِلٌ، وإلَّا اشْتُرِىَ بها شِقْصٌ من عَبْدٍ.

فصل: ويجوزُ تَزْوِيجُ الأمَةِ المَوْقُوفَةِ؛ لأنَّه عَقْدٌ على مَنْفَعَتِها، أشْبَه الإِجارَةَ، ولأنَّ المَوْقُوفَ عليه لا يَمْلِكُ اسْتِيفاءَ هذه المَنْفَعةِ، فلا يَتَضَرَّرُ بِتَمْلِيكِ غيرِه إيَّاها، ووَلِيُّهَا المَوْقُوفُ عليه؛ لأنَّها مِلْكُه، والمَهْرُ له؛ لأنَّه بَدَلُ نَفْعِها، أشْبَهَ الأجْرَ في الإِجَارَةِ. ويَحْتَمِلُ أن لا يجوزَ تَزْوِيجُها؛ لأنَّه عَقْدٌ على نَفْعِها في العُمْرِ، فيُفْضِى إلى تَفْوِيتِ نَفْعِها في حَقِّ البَطْنِ الثانِى، ولأنَّ النِّكاحَ يَتَعَلَّقُ به حُقُوقٌ؛ من وَجُوبِ تَمْكِينِ الزَّوْجِ من اسْتِمْتاعِها، [ومَبِيتِها عندَه] (٢٠)، فتَفُوتُ خِدْمَتُها في اللَّيْلِ على البَطْنِ

الحواشي

(١٩) في م: "فنعفو".(٢٠) سقط من: الأصل.

السابقمجلد 8 · صفحة 226التالي
السابق8·226التالي