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حولتواصلتبرّعبيانات النشرالخصوصيةشروط الاستخدامحق الانسحابإلغاء اشتراك
المغني لابن قدامة - ت التركي
مجلد 8 · صفحة 265

الترجمة · EN

for in that is an invalidation of the right of someone other than the child. If the impediment to disposal ceases, he may retract it, for the child's possession has not ceased; rather, a circumstance occurred that interrupted disposal while possession remained, thus preventing retraction. When the impediment ceases, the prohibition ceases. Mukatabah (contract of manumission) is the same according to those who do not permit the sale of a mukatab slave; this is the school of al-Shafi'i and a group of others. As for those who permit the sale of a mukatab slave, its ruling is the ruling of a leased or married item. Regarding tadbir (stipulating manumission after one's death), the correct view is that it does not prevent sale, so it does not prevent retraction. If we say it does prevent sale, it prevents retraction. Every disposal that does not prevent the child from disposing of the physical substance—such as a bequest, a gift before receipt where required, sexual intercourse, marriage, leasing, mukatabah, and tadbir—if we say it does not prevent sale, as well as sharecropping it, placing it in a mudarabah (profit-sharing) contract, or in a partnership contract, all of this does not prevent retraction because it does not prevent the child's disposal of its physical substance, and likewise is emancipation suspended upon a condition. If he retracts it while the disposal is binding, such as leasing, marriage, or mukatabah, it remains as it is, because the child does not have the right to invalidate it, so neither does the one to whom it was transferred. If it is permissible, like a bequest or a gift before receipt, it is invalidated, because the child has the right to invalidate it. As for tadbir and emancipation suspended on a condition, their ruling does not persist regarding the father, and whenever it returns to the child, their ruling returns. As for a sale in which the child has an option, whether due to a condition, a defect in the price, or other than that, it prevents retraction; because retraction entails the annulment of the child's possession in the substitute for the sold item, and this was not established for him from his side. If the child gifted it to his own son, he does not have the right to retract it, because his retraction is an invalidation of the possession of someone other than his son. If the son retracts his gift, it is possible that the father may have the right to retract his gift at that point, because he annulled his gift by his retraction, so possession returned to him via the original cause. It is also possible that the father does not have the right to retract, because it returned to his son after the possession of someone else had become firmly established over it, making it similar to the case if the son's son had gifted it to his father.

الحواشي

(35) Omitted from the [Original]. (36) In the [Original]: "his father". (37) In the [Original]: "to his son".

العربية (المصدر)

لأنَّ في ذلك إبْطالًا لِحَقِّ غير الوَلَدِ. فإن زالَ المانِعُ من التَّصَرُّفِ، فله الرُّجُوعُ؛ لأنَّ مِلْكَ الابْنِ لم يَزُلْ، وإنَّما طَرَأَ مَعْنًى قَطَعَ التَّصَرُّفَ مع بَقاءِ المِلْكِ، فمَنَعَ الرُّجُوعَ، فإذا زالَ [زال] المَنْعُ، والكِتَابةُ كذلك عند مَنْ لا يَرَى بَيْعَ المُكَاتَبِ. وهو مذهبُ الشافِعِيِّ وجَمَاعَةٍ سواهُ. فأمَّا من أجَازَ بَيْعَ المُكَاتَبِ، فحُكْمُه حُكْمُ المُسْتَأْجَرِ والمُزَوَّجِ. وأما التَّدْبِيرُ، فالصَّحِيحُ أنَّه لا يَمْنَعُ البَيْعَ، فلا يَمْنَعُ الرُّجُوعَ. وإن قُلْنا: يَمْنَعُ البَيْعَ. مَنَعَ الرُّجُوعَ. وكل تَصَرُّفٍ لا يَمْنَعُ الابْنَ التَّصَرُّفَ في الرَّقَبةِ، كالوَصِيَّةِ والهِبَةِ قبلَ القَبْضِ فيما يَفْتَقِرُ إليه (٣٥)، والوَطْءِ والتَّزْوِيجِ والإِجَارَةِ والكِتَابةِ والتَّدْبِيرِ.، إن قُلْنا: لا يَمْنَعُ البَيْعَ، والمُزَارَعَةَ عليها، وجَعْلَها مُضَارَبةً، أو في عَقْدِ شَرِكَةٍ، فكلُّ ذلك لا يَمْنَعُ الرُّجُوعَ؛ لأنَّه لا يَمْنَعُ تَصَرُّفَ الابْنِ في رَقَبَتِها، وكذلك العِتْقُ المُعَلَّقُ على صِفَةٍ. وإذا رَجَعَ وكان التَّصَرُّفُ لازِمًا، كالإِجَارَةِ والتَّزْوِيجِ والكِتَابةِ، فهو باقٍ بحالِه؛ لأنَّ الابْنَ لا يَمْلِكُ إبْطَالَه، فكذلك مَن انْتَقَلَ إليه. وإن كان جائِزًا، كالوَصِيَّةِ والهبَةِ قبلَ القَبْضِ، بَطَلَ؛ لأنَّ الابْنَ يَمْلِكُ إبْطَالَه. وأما التَّدْبِيرُ والعِتْقُ المُعَلَّقُ بصِفَةٍ، فلا يَبْقَى حُكْمُهُما في حَقِّ الأبِ، ومتى عادَ إلى الإِبْنِ، عادَ حُكْمُهُما. فأمَّا البَيْعُ الذي للابْنِ فيه خِيَارٌ، إما لِشَرْطٍ، أو عَيْبٍ في الثّمَنِ، أو غيرِ ذلك، فيَمْنَعُ الرُّجُوعَ؛ لأنَّ الرُّجُوعَ يَتَضَمَّنُ فَسْخَ مِلْكِ الابْنِ في عِوَضِ المَبِيعِ، ولم يَثْبُتْ له ذلك من جِهَتِه. وإن وَهَبَهُ الابْنُ لِابْنِه، لم يَمْلِك الرُّجُوعَ فيه؛ لأنَّ رُجُوعَه إبْطالٌ لمِلْكِ غير ابْنِه. فإن رَجَعَ الابْنُ في هِبَتِه، احْتَمَلَ أن يَمْلِكَ الأبُ الرُّجُوعَ في هِبَتِه حينئذٍ؛ لأنَّه فَسَخَ هِبَتَه بِرُجُوعِه، فعادَ إليه المِلْكُ بالسَّبَبِ الأوَّلِ. ويَحْتَمِلُ أن لا يَمْلِكَ الأبُ الرُّجُوعَ؛ لأنَّه رَجَعَ إلى ابْنِه (٣٦) بعد اسْتِقْرارِ مِلْكِ غيرِه عليه، فأشْبَهَ ما لو وَهَبَهُ ابْنُ الابْنِ لأبِيه (٣٧).

الحواشي

(٣٥) سقط من: الأصل.(٣٦) في الأصل: "أبيه".(٣٧) في الأصل: "لابنه".

السابقمجلد 8 · صفحة 265التالي
السابق8·265التالي