Another narration is reported from Ahmad, stating that the Imam has the authority to exact retaliation on his behalf. This is the school of Abu Hanifa, because it is one of the two types of retaliation, so it is permissible for the Imam to exact it for the foundling, just as with retaliation in the case of a homicide. Our argument is that it is a retaliation whose exaction is not mandatory, so it is deferred until he speaks, just as if he were an adult who is absent. It differs from retaliation in the case of a homicide, for retaliation in that case does not belong to him but to his heir, and the Imam is the one responsible for it.
Section: If the foundling, after reaching puberty, defames a chaste person, he is to be punished with eighty lashes, because he is a free person. If a defamer defames him and he is chaste, the punishment is upon the defamer, because he is ruled to be free. If the defamer claims that he is a slave and the foundling confirms this, the punishment is dropped due to the admission of the one entitled to it regarding the dropping of the punishment; however, a discretionary punishment (ta'zir) is required for defaming one who is not chaste. If the foundling denies it and says, "I am free," his word is accepted, because he is ruled to be free, and his statement conforms to the apparent state; it is for this reason that we imposed the punishment for a free person upon him if he were the defamer, and we established the right of retaliation for him even if the perpetrator is a free person. It is possible that the word of the defamer is to be accepted, because it is possible that what he said is true, in that he could be the son of a slave woman, which constitutes a doubt (shubha), and punishment is warded off by doubts. This differs from retaliation for him if the perpetrator claims he is a slave, because retaliation is not a fixed punishment (hadd) but rather a right owed to a human being, which is why reconciliation and accepting a substitute for it are permissible, unlike the punishment for defamation. It may be inferred from this that if the foundling is the defamer and claims he is a slave so that the punishment of a slave might be imposed upon him, it is accepted from him for that reason. The first view is more correct, because anyone who is ruled to be free does not have the punishment against his defamer dropped due to the possibility of his servile status, as evidenced by one of unknown lineage. If the punishment were to be dropped for this possibility, it would be dropped even if the defamer did not claim his servile status, because the possibility exists even if he does not claim it.
(8) In M: "yandari" (it is warded off).
رُوِىَ عن أحمدَ رِوَايةٌ أخرى، أنَّ للإِمَامِ اسْتِيفَاءَ القِصَاصِ له. وهو مذهبُ أبى حنيفةَ؛ لأنَّه أحَدُ نَوْعَىِ القِصَاصِ. فكان للإِمَامِ اسْتِيفاؤُه عن اللَّقِيطِ، كالقِصَاصِ في النَّفْسِ. ولَنا، أنه قِصَاصٌ لم يَتَحَتَّم اسْتِيفاؤُه، فوَقَفَ على قَوْلِه، كما لو كان بالِغًا غائِبًا، وفارَقَ القِصَاصَ في النَّفْسِ، فإنَّ القِصَاصَ ليس هو له، إنَّما هو لِوَارِثِه، والإِمامُ المُتَوَلِّى له.
فصل: وإن قَذَفَ اللَّقِيطُ بعدَ بُلُوغِه مُحْصَنًا، حُدَّ ثَمَانِينَ؛ لأنَّه حُرٌّ. وإن قَذَفَه قاذِفٌ، وهو مُحْصَنٌ، فعليه الحَدُّ؛ لأنَّه مَحْكُومٌ بِحُرِّيّتِه. فإن ادَّعَى القاذِفُ أنَّه عَبْدٌ، فصَدَّقَه اللَّقِيطُ، سَقَطَ الحَدُّ؛ لإِقْرارِ المُسْتَحِقِّ بِسُقُوطِ الحَدِّ، ويَجِبُ التَّعْزِيرُ، لِقَذْفِه مَنْ ليس بمُحْصَنٍ. وإن كَذَّبَه اللَّقِيطُ، وقال: إنِّي حُرٌّ فالقولُ قولُه؛ لأنَّه مَحْكُومٌ بِحُرِّيَّتِه، فقولُه مُوَافِقٌ لِلظّاهِرِ، ولذلك أوْجَبْنا عليه حَدَّ الحُرِّ إذا كان قاذِفًا، وأوْجَبْنا له القِصَاصَ، وإن كان الجانِى حُرًّا. ويَحْتَمِلُ أن يكونَ القولُ قولَ القاذِفِ؛ لأنَّه يَحْتَمِلُ صِحَّةَ ما قالَه، بأن يكونَ ابنَ أمَةٍ، فيكونَ ذلك شُبْهةً، والحَدُّ يُدْرَأُ (٨) بالشُّبُهاتِ. وفارَقَ القِصَاصَ له إذا ادَّعَى الجانِى عليه أنه عَبْدٌ؛ لأنَّ القِصَاصَ ليس بِحَدٍّ، وإنما: وَجَبَ حَقًّا لآدَمِيٍّ، ولذلك جازَتِ المُصَالَحةُ عنه، وأخْذُ بَدَلِه، بخِلَافِ حَدِّ القَذْفِ. ويَتَخَرَّجُ مِن هذا أنَّ اللَّقِيطَ إذا كان قاذِفًا، فادَّعَى أنَّه عَبْدٌ لِيَجِبَ عليه حَدُّ العَبْدِ، قُبِلَ منه؛ لذلك. والأوّلُ أصَحُّ؛ لأنَّ كلَّ من كان مَحْكُومًا بِحُرِّيَّتِه، لا يَسْقُطُ الحَدُّ عن قاذِفِه باحْتِمالِ رِقِّه، بِدَلِيلِ مَجْهُولِ النَّسَبِ، ولو سَقَطَ الحَدُّ لهذا الاحْتِمالِ، لَسَقَطَ وإن لم يَدَّعِ القاذِفُ رِقَّه؛ لأنَّه مَوْجُودٌ وإن لم يَدَّعِه.
(٨) في م: "يندرئ".