The bequest made after the wounding was issued by its rightful owner regarding his own property and nothing occurred to invalidate it, unlike when it preceded it, for in that case, the killing occurred subsequently to the bequest, thereby invalidating it, as it invalidates that which is more emphasized than it. This is confirmed by the fact that killing only prevents inheritance because by killing, the heir hastens the inheritance whose cause has been established; thus, he is met with the opposite of his intention, which is the prevention of inheritance, in order to avert the evil of killing the inheritors. For this reason, the tadbir (grant of deferred emancipation) is also invalidated by the killing that occurs subsequently to it. This meaning is realized in the case of killing that occurs subsequently to a bequest, for he might have hastened it by killing him. It differs from killing before the bequest, for he did not intend by it to hasten any wealth due to the absence of the establishment of its cause, and the testator is content with the bequest to him after the occurrence of what he had done regarding him. There is no difference between intentional and accidental killing in this regard, just as the situation does not differ regarding inheritance. Based on this, whenever he grants tadbir to his slave after having wounded him, his tadbir is valid.

976 - Issue: He said: "If he says: 'One of my two slaves is free,' lots are cast between them, and whoever the lot falls upon is free, provided it is covered by the one-third."

The gist of this is that if he emancipates an unspecified slave, lots are cast between them, and the free one is determined by the lot. Abu Hanifah and al-Shafi'i said: He has the right to designate one of them without casting lots, because it is an emancipation due from unspecified persons, so the designation is up to the emancipator, like emancipation in an expiation (kaffarah), or as if he said to his heirs: "Emancipate a slave on my behalf." Our view is that it is an emancipation that one of a group of specified persons is entitled to, so his extraction is by casting lots, just as if he emancipated both of them and only one of them could be covered by his one-third. The evidence for the ruling in the original case is the hadith of 'Imran ibn Husayn. As for emancipation in expiation, no one is entitled to it; rather, the one performing the expiation is only obligated to perform it. As for if he says: "Emancipate a slave on my behalf," if he does not attribute it to his slaves or to a specific group other than them, it is like the emancipation in expiation. If he says: "Emancipate one of my slaves," it is possible that we might say that he is extracted by casting lots, as in our issue, and it is possible that it is referred back to the choice of the heirs.