its guardianship does not cease, and an upright person is joined with him to oversee matters alongside him. This was narrated from al-Hasan and Ibn Sirin; because it is possible to preserve the property through the upright person, and to obtain the supervision of the executor by keeping him in the position of executor, thus reconciling between the two rights. If it is not possible to preserve the property through the upright person, it becomes necessary to remove the hand of the dissolute, treacherous person and terminate his power of disposition, because preserving the property for the orphan takes precedence over upholding the corrupt statement of the testator. As for distinguishing between the dissolute conduct that occurs subsequently and that which is concurrent, this is far-fetched; for conditions are considered in their persistence just as they are considered at their inception, especially if they are for a meaning that is needed throughout the duration. Even if there were no escape from distinguishing, the consideration of probity in its persistence would be more appropriate, because if the dissoluteness existed at the time of the bequest, the testator was content with it despite knowing his condition, and he bequeathed to him while being satisfied with his disposition despite his dissoluteness. This implies that he knew he possessed enough compassion for the orphan to prevent him from neglecting him or betraying him regarding his property, unlike the case where the dissoluteness occurs subsequently, for he was not content with him in that state, and the consideration lies in his satisfaction—do you not see that if he bequeathed to one person, it is permissible for him to dispose [of the property] alone, whereas if he bequeathed to two, it is not permissible for one to dispose [of the property] alone.
Section: As for the upright person who is unable to oversee matters due to an illness or weakness, the bequest to him is valid, and the judge joins an upright person with him, without removing his hand from the property or his supervision, because the weak person is qualified for guardianship and trust, so the bequest to him is valid. Likewise, if he were strong and then a weakness or illness occurred in him, the judge shall join another hand with him, and the first shall remain the executor to the exclusion of the second, and this one is a helper; because the guardianship of the judge only occurs in the absence of an executor. This is the opinion of al-Shafi'i and Abu Yusuf, and I know of no one who disagrees with them.
Section: If the state of the executor changes due to insanity, disbelief, or prodigality, his guardianship ceases, and it becomes as if he had never been bequeathed to. The matter returns to the judge, who then appoints an upright person to oversee the deceased's affairs and the affairs of his children after him, as if he had not left behind an executor. If his state changed after the bequest and before
(3) In the original: "and not".
لا تزولُ وِلايتُه، ويُضمُّ إليه أمينٌ يَنْظُرُ معه. ورُوِىَ ذلك عنِ الحسنِ، وابنِ سِيرينَ؛ لأنَّه أمْكَنَ حِفْظُ المالِ بالأمينِ، وتحْصِيلُ نَظَرِ الوَصِىِّ بإبْقائِه في الوَصِيَّةِ، فيكونُ جمعًا بين الْحَقَّينِ. وإن لم يُمْكِنْ حِفْظُ المالِ بالأمِينِ، تَعيَّنَ إزالةُ يَدِ الفاسقِ الخائنِ وقطعُ تَصرُّفِه؛ لأنَّ حِفْظَ المالِ على اليتيمِ أوْلَى من رِعَايةِ قولِ المُوصِى الفاسدِ. وأمَّا التَّفْريقُ بين الفِسْقِ الطَّارِئُ وبينَ المُقارِنِ، فبعيدٌ؛ فإنَّ الشُّروطَ تُعْتَبَرُ في الدَّوامِ، كاعْتبارِها في الابتداءِ، سِيَّما إذا كانت لمعنًى يَحتاجُ إليه في الدَّوامِ، ولو لم يكنْ بدٌّ من التفريقِ، لَكانَ اعتبارُ العَدالةِ في الدَّوامِ أوْلَى، مِن قِبلِ أنَّ الفِسْقَ إذا كانَ مَوْجُودًا حالَ الوَصِيَّةِ، فقد رَضِىَ به المُوصِى، مع عِلْمِه بحالِه، وأوْصَى إليه رَاضِيًا بِتَصرُّفِه مع فِسْقِهِ، فيُشْعِرُ ذلك بأنَّه عَلِمَ أنَّ عندَه من الشَّفَقةِ على اليتيمِ ما يَمْنعُه من التَّفْريطِ فيه وخِيانتِه في مالِه، بخلافِ ما إذا طَرَأَ الفِسْقُ، فإنَّه لم يَرْضَ به على تلك الحالِ، والاعتبارُ برِضَاهُ، ألا تَرَى أنَّه لو أوْصَى إلى واحدٍ، جازَ له التَّصَرُّفُ وَحْدَه، ولو وَصَّى إلى اثنينِ، لم يَجُزْ للواحدِ التَّصَرُّفُ.
فصل: وأمَّا العَدْلُ الذي يَعجِزُ عن النَّظرِ، لِعلَّةٍ أو ضَعْفٍ، فإنَّ الوَصِيَّةَ تَصحُّ إليه، ويَضُمُّ إليه الحاكمُ أمِينًا، ولا يُزِيلُ يَدَه عن المالِ، ولا نظرَه؛ لأنَّ الضَّعيفَ أهلٌ للولايةِ والأمانةِ، فصَحَّتِ الوَصِيَّةُ إليه. وهكذا إن كانَ قَوِيًّا، فحدَثَ فيه ضعفٌ أو عِلَّةٌ، ضَمَّ الحاكمُ إليه يَدًا أُخْرَى، ويكون الأوَّلُ هو الوَصِىَّ دونَ الثاني، وهذا معاونٌ؛ لأنَّ وِلايةَ الحاكِم إنَّما تكونُ عندَ عَدَمِ الوَصِىِّ. وهذا قولُ الشافعىِّ، وأبى يوسف. ولا (٣) أعلمُ لهما مُخالِفًا.
فصل: وإذا تَغيَّرتْ حالُ الوَصِىِّ بجُنونٍ، أو كُفرٍ، أو سَفَهٍ، زالتْ ولايتُه، وصارَ كأنَّه لم يُوصَ إليه، ويرجعُ الأمرُ إلى الحاكمِ، فيُقِيمُ أمِينًا ناظرًا للمَيِّتِ في أمرِه وأمر أولادِه من بَعْدِه، كما لو لم يُخْلِفْ وَصيًّا. وإن تَغيَّرتْ حالُه بعدَ الوَصِيَّةِ وقبلَ
(٣) في الأصل: "ولم".