its removal from his house, so he removed it without a need. This is because sleeping on it, leaving two locks on it, and increasing the measures taken to safeguard it draws attention to the thief and encourages him to strive in stealing it and contriving to take it. Our position is that this is more protective for it, so he is not liable for his action, just as if he ordered him to leave it in the courtyard of the house, and he left it inside the house; by this, what they mentioned is invalidated.
Section: If he said: "Place it in this room, and do not let anyone enter it," and he allowed people to enter it, and one of them stole it, he is liable for it because it was lost due to his transgression and opposition [to the order]. It is the same whether he stole it while he was allowing them to enter or afterwards, because he might have seen the trust while entering the room, learned its location, and the way to reach it. If it was stolen by someone who did not enter the room, the Qadi said: He is not liable, because his action was not a cause for its destruction. It is possible that liability is binding upon him, because the one who entered might have pointed it out to one who did not enter, and because it is an opposition that necessitates liability if it was a cause for its destruction, so it makes it obligatory even if it were not a cause, just as if he forbade him from removing it, and he removed it without a need.
Section: If he said: "Put this ring on the little finger," and he put it on the ring finger, he is not liable for it, because it is thicker and more protective for it, unless it does not fit, so he puts it on its upper knuckle and is thus liable for it, or it breaks due to its thickness on it, in which case he is also liable for it, because his opposition is a cause for its damage.
1070 - Issue: He said: (And if he deposited something with him, then he asked him to pay it to him at a time when that was possible for him, and he did not do so until it was destroyed, then he is liable.)
There is no disagreement regarding the obligation to return the trust to its owner when he requests it and it is possible to perform it to him without necessity. God Almighty has commanded this, saying: {Indeed, God commands you to render trusts to whom they are due}.
(27) In A and M: "so it necessitated". (28) Omitted from B.