Section: It is not established that she is a slave woman by mere claim. If he provides evidence for that, it is established. If she admits that she is a slave woman, Ahmad said in a narration to Al-Harith: He is not entitled to her by her admission, because her admission removes the marriage from her and establishes a right over someone else, so it is not accepted, just like her admission of a debt against someone else. He said, in a narration by Hanbal: He has nothing until he proves it, or she admits that she is his slave woman. The apparent meaning of this is that her admission is accepted, because she is admitting against herself regarding slavery, resembling someone other than a wife. The first [view] is more appropriate. We do not concede that her admission of slavery is accepted from someone other than a wife after she had already admitted her freedom, because she has admitted to something involving the right of Allah the Almighty.
Section: If the woman who was deceived becomes pregnant, and an assailant strikes her abdomen, causing her to miscarry a dead fetus, then a ghurra (indemnity) is upon the assailant, because this fetus is ruled to be free, and its heirs—whoever they may be—inherit from it, and upon the assailant is the expiation for manslaughter. If the assailant is its father, he does not inherit from it, but its relatives do. It is not mandatory to provide this child to the master, because he is only entitled to a living [child], and this one is dead. It is possible that he is entitled to a tenth of the value of her mother, because the one who had intercourse with her caused him to lose that due to the belief in her freedom, whereas otherwise it would have been due to him.
Section: If a woman marries a slave while believing he is a free man, the marriage is valid. This is the opinion of Abu Hanifa and one of the two opinions of Al-Shafi'i, because the difference in attribute does not prevent the validity of the contract, just as if one were to marry a slave woman believing her to be free. This applies if the conditions of marriage are met and it was with the permission of his master. If the woman is free and we say: freedom is not one of the conditions of equality (kafa'a), or that the lack of equality does not invalidate the marriage, then it is valid, and the woman has the choice between rescinding it or confirming it. If she chooses to confirm it, her guardians have the right to object to her due to the lack of equality. If she is a slave woman, then she should also have the choice, because since the choice is established for a male slave if he is deceived by a slave woman, it is established for a slave woman if she is deceived by a male slave.
(51) In M: "he stood". (52) In M: "a slave girl". (53) In A, B, M: "from a slave girl".
فصل: ولا يَثْبُتُ أنَّها أمَةٌ بمُجَرَّدِ الدَّعْوَى، فإن أقامَ (٥١) بذلك بَيِّنةً، ثَبَتَ. وإن أقَرَّتْ أنَّها أمَةٌ، فقال أحمدُ، فى رِوايةِ إلى الحارثِ: لا يَسْتَحِقُّها بإقْرارِها؛ وذلك لأنَّ إقْرَارَها يُزِيلُ النِّكاحَ عنها، ويُثْبِتُ حقًّا على غيرِها، فلم يُقْبَلْ، كإقْرارِها بمالٍ على غيرِها. وقال، فى رِوايةِ حَنْبَلٍ: لا شىءَ له حتى يُثْبِتَ، أو تُقِرَّ هى أنها أمَتُه (٥٢). فظاهِرُ هذا أنَّه يُقْبَلُ إقْرارُها؛ لأنَّها مُقِرَّةٌ على نَفْسِها بالرِّقِّ، أشْبَهَ غيرَ الزَّوْجةِ. والأَوّلُ أَوْلَى. ولا نُسَلِّمُ أنَّه يُقْبَلُ من غيرِ ذات الزَّوْجِ إقْرَارُها بالرِّقِّ بعدَ إقْرارِها بالحُرِّيَّةِ؛ لأنَّها أقَرَّتْ بما يَتَعَلَّقُ به حَقُّ اللَّهِ تعالى.
فصل: إذا حَمَلَتِ المَغْرُورُ بها، فضَرَبَ بَطْنَها ضارِبٌ، فأَلْقَتْ جَنِينًا مَيِّتًا، فعلى الضاربِ غُرَّةٌ؛ لأنَّ هذا الجَنِينَ محكومٌ بحُرِّيَّتِه، ويَرِثُها ورَثَتُه مَنْ كانوا، وعلى الضَّاربِ كَفَّارةُ القَتْلِ. وإن كان الضاربُ أباه، لم يَرِثْه، ووَرِثَه أقارِبُه. ولا يَجِبُ بَذْلُ هذا الولدِ للسَّيِّدِ؛ لأنَّه إنَّما يسْتَحِقُّ بَذْلَ حَىٍّ، وهذا مَيِّتٌ. ويَحْتَمِلُ أن يَجِبَ له عُشْرُ قِيمَةِ أُمِّهِ؛ لأنَّ الواطئَ فَوّتَ ذلك عليه باعْتِقادِ الحُرِّيةِ، ولَوْلاه لوَجَبَ له ذلك.
فصل: إذا تَزَوَّجتِ المرأةُ عبدًا على أنَّه حُرٌّ، فالنِّكاحُ صحيحٌ. وهذا قولُ أبى حنيفةَ، وأحدُ قَوْلَىِ الشافعىِّ؛ لأنَّ اخْتِلافَ الصِّفَةِ لا يَمْنَعُ صِحّةَ العقدِ، كما لو تَزَوّجَ أمَةً على أنَّها حُرَّةٌ. وهذا إذا كمَلتْ شُرُوطُ النِّكاحِ، وكان ذلك بإذْنِ سَيِّدِه. وإن كانت المرأةُ حُرّةً، وقُلْنا: الحُرِّيةُ ليست من شُرُوطِ الكَفاءةِ. أو أَنَّ فَقْدَ الكفاءةِ لا يُبْطِلُ النِّكاحَ. فهو صحيحٌ، وللمَرْأةِ الخِيارُ بين الفَسْخِ والإِمْضاءِ، فإن اختارتْ إمْضاءَه، فلأَوْلِيائِها الاعْتراضُ عليها لعَدَمِ الكَفاءةِ. وإن كانت أمَةً فينْبَغِى أن يكونَ لها الخِيارُ أيضًا؛ لأنَّه لمَّا ثَبَتَ الخِيارُ للعَبْدِ إذا غُرَّ بأمَةٍ (٥٣)، ثَبَتَ للأَمَةِ إذا غُرَّتْ بعَبْدٍ. وكلُّ
(٥١) فى م: "قام".(٥٢) فى م: "أمة".(٥٣) فى أ، ب، م: "من أمة".