Mas'ud. Then it is possible that he used this as a metonymy (kinayah) for sexual intercourse. As for looking at the rest of the body, it does not spread prohibition. Some of our companions said: There is no difference between looking at the private part and the rest of the body with desire. The correct view is the opposite of this, for that which is not a private part cannot be analogized to it, due to the difference between them. There is no disagreement that we know of regarding the fact that looking at the face does not establish prohibition, and the same applies to other parts. Furthermore, there is no disagreement that if the looking occurs without desire, it does not spread prohibition; for touching, which is more emphatic (44) than it, has no effect if it is without desire, so looking is even more so. The place of disagreement regarding touching and looking is concerning someone who has reached an age where enjoyment is possible from her, such as a girl of nine years or older. As for a young child, this does not apply. It has been narrated from Ahmad, regarding a girl of seven years: If he kisses her, her mother becomes unlawful to him. The Qadi said: In my view, this is interpreted as referring to the age at which desire can exist.
Section: If a woman looks at the private part of a man (45) with desire, its ruling regarding prohibition is the same as the ruling of his looking at her. Ahmad explicitly stated this; because it is a meaning that necessitates prohibition, so the man and the woman are equal in it, just like sexual intercourse. Likewise, the ruling on her touching him and kissing him with desire should be the same, for the reason we mentioned.
Section: As for being in seclusion (khalwa) with a woman, the correct view is that it does not spread prohibition. It has been narrated from Ahmad: If he is in seclusion with a woman, the dower (sadaq) and the waiting period (idda) become obligatory, and it is not permissible for him to marry her mother or her daughter. The Qadi said: This is interpreted as meaning that intimacy occurred along with the seclusion, so his statement is explained according to one of the two narrations we mentioned. As for when it is devoid of that, it has no effect on the prohibition of the stepdaughter, because of the contradiction this would pose to His saying, the Almighty: "If you have not entered into them, there is no blame upon you," and His saying: "And lawful to you are [all others] beyond these." As for seclusion with a marriageable woman (ajnabiyyah) or his slave woman, it does not spread prohibition. We know of no disagreement regarding this. Everyone whose marriage is prohibited, sexual intercourse with her is prohibited by right of ownership (milk al-yamin); because if the contract intended for sexual intercourse is prohibited, then sexual intercourse itself is even more so.
(44) Omitted from: [B]. (45) In [B]: "al-rajul" (the man).
مسعودٍ. ثم يَحْتَمِلُ أنَّه كَنَى بذلك عن الوَطْءِ. وأمَّا النظرُ إلى سائرِ البَدَنِ فلا يَنْشُرُ حُرْمةً. وقال بعضُ أصحابِنا: لا فَرْقَ بين النَّظَرِ إلى الفَرْجِ وسائرِ البَدَنِ لشَهْوةٍ. والصحيحُ، خِلافُ هذا؛ فإنَّ غيرَ الفَرْجِ لا يُقاسُ عليه، لما بينهما من الفَرْقِ، ولا خِلافَ نَعْلَمُه فى أَنَّ النَّظرَ إلى الوَجْهِ لا يُثْبِتُ الحُرْمةَ، فكذلك غيرُه، ولا خِلافَ أيضًا فى أَنَّ النَّظرَ إذا وَقَعَ من غير شَهْوةٍ لا ينشرُ حُرْمةً؛ لأنَّ اللَّمْسَ الذى هو أبْلَغُ منه (٤٤) لا يُؤَثِّرُ إذا كان لغيرِ شَهْوةٍ، فالنَّظَرُ أَوْلَى. ومَوْضِعُ الخِلافِ فى اللَّمْس والنَّظرِ فى من بَلَغَتْ سِنَّا يُمْكِنُ الاسْتِمْتاعُ منها، كابْنةِ تِسْعٍ فما زاد، فأمَّا الطِّفْلةُ فلا يَثْبُتُ فيها ذلك. وقد رُوِىَ عن أحمدَ، فى بنتِ سَبْعٍ: إذا قَبَّلَها حَرُمتْ عليه أُمُّها. قال القاضى: هذا عندى مَحْمولٌ على السِّنِّ الذى تُوجَدُ معه الشَّهْوةُ.
فصل: فإن نَظَرَتِ المرأةُ إلى فَرْجِ رَجُلٍ (٤٥) لشَهْوةٍ، فحكمُه فى التَّحْريمِ حكمُ نَظَرِه إليها. نَصَّ عليه أحمدُ؛ لأنَّه مَعْنًى يُوجِبُ التَّحْريمَ، فاسْتَوَى فيه الرجلُ والمرأةُ كالجِماعِ. وكذلك ينْبَغِى أن يكونَ حكمُ لَمْسِها له، وقُبْلَتِها إيَّاه لشَهْوةٍ؛ لما ذكرْنا.
فصل: فأمَّا الخَلْوةُ بالمرأةِ، فالصَّحيحُ أنَّها لا تنْشُرُ حُرْمةً. وقد رُوِىَ عن أحمدَ: إذا خَلا بالمرأةِ، وَجَبَ الصَّدَاقُ والعِدَّةُ، ولا يَحِلُّ له أن يتزَوَّجَ أُمَّها وابْنتَها. قال القاضى: هذا محمولٌ على أنَّه حَصَلَ مع الخَلْوةِ مُباشَرةٌ، فيُخَرَّجُ كلامُه على إحْدَى الرِّوايتَيْنِ اللَّتَيْنِ ذكرناهما، فأمَّا مع خُلُوِّه من ذلك، فلا يُؤثِّرُ فى تَحْريمِ الرَّبِيبَةِ؛ لما فى ذلك من مُخالفةِ قولِه سبحانه: {فَإِنْ لَمْ تَكُونُوا دَخَلْتُمْ بِهِنَّ فَلَا جُنَاحَ عَلَيْكُمْ}. وقوله: {وَأُحِلَّ لَكُمْ مَا وَرَاءَ ذَلِكُمْ}. وأمَّا الخَلْوةُ بأجْنَبِيَّة، أو أمَتِه، فلا تَنْشُرُ تَحْرِيمًا. لا نعلمُ فى ذلك خِلافًا. كلُّ مَن حُرِّمَ نكاحُها حُرِّمَ وَطْؤُها بمِلْكِ اليمينِ؛ لأنَّه إذا حُرِّمَ العَقْدُ المُراد للوَطْءِ، فالوَطْءُ أَوْلَى.
(٤٤) سقط من: ب.(٤٥) فى ب: "الرجل".