two times. If one of them acts quickly and kills him, the blood-money becomes obligatory for the other upon his wealth, whichever one it may be. Abu Hanifah and Malik said: He is killed for the group, and they have no other choice, and if some of them seek the blood-money, it is not for them; if one of them acts quickly and kills him, the right of the rest is forfeited. This is because if a group killed one person, they would be killed for him; likewise, if one person kills a group, he is killed for them, just as one is killed for one. Al-Shafi'i said: He is not killed except for one, whether they agreed [to seek retaliation] or did not agree, because if each one has the right to carry out retaliation, their participation in the demand does not necessitate the merging of their rights, like all other rights. Our evidence against Abu Hanifah is the saying of the Prophet (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him): "Whoever has a person killed [from among his kin], his family has two choices: if they wish, they may kill, and if they wish, they may take the blood-money." The literal implication of this is that the family of every killed person is entitled to what they choose of either killing or blood-money; so if they agree to the killing, it is obligatory for them, and if some of them choose the blood-money, it becomes obligatory for him according to the literal implication of the report. Furthermore, these are two crimes that do not merge if they were unintentional or if one of them was, so they do not merge in intentional crimes, just like crimes against limbs, which they have conceded. Our evidence against Al-Shafi'i is that this is a subject to which two rights are attached that cannot both be satisfied together; the two entitled parties have been satisfied with one [retaliation] for both, so it suffices, just as if a slave killed two slaves unintentionally and he was satisfied with taking [blood-money] for both. Also, because they both agreed to less than their right, so it is permitted, as if the owner of a sound limb was satisfied with a paralyzed one, or the guardian of a free person with a slave, or the guardian of a Muslim with a disbeliever. This differs from when the killing is unintentional, for the crime is owed as a liability (dhimma), and the liability is broad enough to accommodate many rights. What Malik and Abu Hanifah mentioned is not correct; for...